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Spreading Fear, Communicating Trust: Writing Letters and Telegrams during the 
Panic of 1873 
 
Abstract: 
This article analyses how journalists and businessmen used and perceived the Atlantic 
cable following the failure of New York banking house Jay Cooke & Co. in September 1873, 
an event which sparked stock markets panics in Vienna and Berlin. It is argued that while 
bankers successfully used telegraphic cables to communicate intelligence such as price 
information, letters proved superior as a medium for establishing personal trust, as the case of 
New York banker George Opdyke shows. Journalists, too, were critical of the telegraph’s 
performance, blaming the paucity of information available on the technology’s supposedly 
inherent deficiencies. This criticism, it is argued, was ultimately based on the ‘imagined 
reception’ of cables by their senders, as well as on the persistence of earlier imagined uses of 
telegraphy. These, I argue, continued to inform contemporary expectations of telegraphy’s 
performance. 
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‘The telegraph being alike open to all puts the whole community upon a par, and 
will thus ‘head off’ the most adroit speculators, because they will not have the power 
to monopolize intelligence’.1 These words, written by a business observer in 1846, 
neatly capture the technological optimism prevalent among many contemporaries in 
telegraphy’s early years. In this imagination, telegraphy would be used to make 
business transactions fairer, and more equal. No longer would a select few 
monopolists be allowed to take unfair advantage of exclusively obtained information. 
Instead, the telegraph would spread financial and economic intelligence far and wide. 
In reality, of course, the telegraph never was truly ‘open to all’; rather, it was 
accessible only to a small slice of the population which could afford its services.2 Still, 
within the narrow confines of the business community, the new technology did help 
even out informational asymmetries, as powerful bankers such as the Rothschilds  
quickly realized.3  
By the 1870s, the telegraph had spread far and wide, as many business authors 
observed. According to Charles W. H. Schultz, in New York City ‘every broker’s 
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office, as well as … all the principal hotels, restaurants, and bar-rooms throughout the 
city’ featured ‘a telegraphic machine … for the information of customers, on which 
every transaction on stocks is recorded as soon as made.’4 Such ‘information’ was 
often termed ‘intelligence’ in nineteenth-century business parlance, and denoted 
anything that could form the basis of a financial transaction or investment decision. 
As such, it could be both quantitative and qualitative in nature. As contemporary 
financial publications make clear, both news of certain events – such as the 
manoeuvres of a stock exchange clique or financial transactions by the government – 
as well as quantitative information about railway dividends or earnings could be 
termed ‘intelligence’ as long as it was considered useful to an investor.5 An 1865 
stock exchange manual claimed that the price of government securities depended 
‘only on political and financial events, which speculators can foresee in proportion to 
the acuteness of their intelligence’.6 Brokerage houses accordingly advertised their 
services by promising access to information which was normally reserved for 
insiders.7 Commenting on such insider knowledge, the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, America’s foremost business publication, wondered on one occasion 
whether the most recent movements on the New York Stock Exchange could be 
explained by speculators’ ‘private intelligence as to the government transactions’ 
(October 12, 1872). In continuity with earlier uses, the term retained, in this context, 
its association with secrecy. Financial intelligence in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, then, remained both coveted and elusive.8  Even as financial publications 
replete with columns and spreadsheets became more widely and quickly available, the 
fear of being outmanoeuvred by a better and/or faster speculator continued to 
permeate writings about investment and speculation. Telegraphy occupied a central 
place in this discourse on intelligence and insider knowledge. Its imagined use was 
manifold. While well-established figures such as the Rothschilds believed it would 
hurt their business by giving rivals equal access to valuable market information, 
others anticipated that more widely dispersed information would allow markets to 
grow both geographically and in volume, and reduce informational asymmetries. 
Contemporary entrepreneurs as well as public authorities had been quick to spot 
telegraphy’s potential for financial transactions. Following the laying of telegraphic 
cables between major cities in Europe and North America from the late 1840s 
onwards, the transmission of commercial and financial information via cable quickly 
became a lucrative business opportunity for newly established news agencies. The 
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notion that telegraphy should work in the interests of all – and not just a select few – 
participants in the marketplace was codified in the 1869 agreement signed between 
the Prussian state and Prussia’s foremost news agency, Wolff’s Telegraphisches 
Bureau. While exempting telegrams containing commercial news from prior 
inspection by state officials, the contract also stipulated that ‘all publications 
pertaining to commercial interests’ should be transmitted ‘only in an equitable manner 
that precludes every form of preferential treatment’. 9  In the United States, the 
Associated Press (AP), a coalition of regional press associations, employed agents to 
collect news and information which they forwarded to Western Union (WU). In 1866, 
the year of the laying of the first transatlantic telegraph cable, WU controlled more 
than ninety percent of the telegraphy market, and provided subscribers with a 
synopsis of prices several times a day. Together, they formed a double-headed 
monopoly from which many American newspapers who could not afford their 
services found themselves excluded.10  
Historians and economists have largely echoed contemporary assessments when 
examining telegraphy’s effects on the economy in general, and financial markets in 
particular. According to their account, telegraphy had a rationalizing effect on 
financial transactions, the perhaps most conspicuous manifestation being a price 
convergence between stocks cross-listed on different European and American 
bourses. Thus Christopher Hoag has shown that following the introduction of the 
Atlantic cable, the information lag between markets in New York and London 
shortened from ten days to hours. In commodity trading, telegraphy facilitated the 
practice of futures trading (where buyers and sellers agreed to exchange goods at a 
certain price on a specified date in the future), increasing the volume of trade by 
accelerating the flow of information. Summing up the relevant literature on the topic, 
Roland Wenzlhuemer has recently concluded that thanks to the telegraph, investments 
became ‘more predictable and thus safer’.11 David Hochfelder has provided a more 
complex account of the relationship between speculation and telegraphy, arguing that 
telegraphy both reduced certain kinds of speculation (notably arbitrage) while 
simultaneously encouraging others.12 Such accounts generally adopt a relatively broad 
temporal perspective, exploring the smoothing of prices and transactions over periods 
of several years or decades. This perspective, however, tends to obscure the question 
of how telegraphy was used, and was seen to perform, during periods of financial 
crises. These, by their very nature, last only days or, at most, weeks, and are 
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characterized by a widespread breakdown of trust and confidence in financial 
institutions, a sudden (subjective) realization that deposits are no longer safe, that 
debts will not be honoured. 13  Given that such periods of financial disruption 
constituted a profound challenge to economic rationality and order, it seems all the 
more pertinent to examine how telegraphy’s promise of efficiency and progress held 
up under extreme circumstances. In line with this special issue’s overall framework, 
then, the question at stake is how both imagined use and imagined reception 
influenced actual use during a moment of crisis. Thanks to David Paull Nickles, we 
know that telegraphy in the nineteenth century more often than not helped to 
exacerbate political crises by inundating officials with a flood of hard-to-process 
information while depriving them of time to carefully weigh their options.14 It thus 
seems promising to examine whether telegraphy had a similar effect on decision-
makers during financial crises. Indeed, the nexus between technology, financial 
stability, and efficiency is still widely debated today. There is, as yet, no consensus on 
whether recent developments in electronic trading, especially high-frequency trading, 
are more likely to improve or destabilize markets (though it does seem as though its 
benefits have thus far disproportionately accrued to a small minority of market 
participants).15 
Faced with a dearth of relevant historical studies on this question, some historians 
have speculated that telegraphy helped prevent financial crises. Others have suggested 
that telegraphic cables, by spreading rumours, rendered financial markets more rather 
than less crisis-prone. 16  Dwayne Winseck has examined the relationship between 
telegraphy and the financial crisis of 1873, arguing that ‘submarine cables and 
telegraphic news … were fully enmeshed in the events’, both fuelling the speculative 
bubble and acting as an agent of contagion when it burst. While Winseck’s account 
does much to complicate the standard narrative of telegraphy’s rationalizing effect on 
business, it, too, adopts a relatively broad temporal perspective, covering the years 
from 1869–1875, and furthermore is based exclusively on English-language sources.17  
This article will address the issue of financial panics and telegraphy by focusing on 
the use and imagined reception of telegraphic cables during the period of acute 
financial distress in September and October 1873, thus integrating perspectives of 
cultural and business history with the history of technology.  The panics of 187318 
were the first to occur following the laying of the Atlantic cable in 1866. Drawing on 
American, British, German, and Austrian sources, I will show that transatlantic 
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telegraphy provided timely intelligence to bankers and merchants during a time of 
financial distress, and was instrumental in smoothing disruptions to the exchange 
market in late September and early October. In this respect, the ‘imagined use’ of 
telegraphy of earlier periods was translated into actual use. In a second step, however, 
I will show that when evaluating telegraphy’s role during this period, it is not 
sufficient to focus on the established practice of using telegraphy to relay standardized 
information. Rather, we must also examine the ways in which telegraphy was found 
to be deficient when crisis struck, when, in other words, imagined use and reception 
conflicted with actual use. When, as in a financial crisis, confidence suddenly breaks 
down, a restoration of confidence may be brought about through a single 
announcement of a financial transaction, such as an increase of the money supply or 
an influx of specie across the Atlantic. In other cases, however, when people doubt 
the solvency not of the system but of an individual, something more immaterial and 
complex – personal trust – is at stake, and the transmission of intelligence no longer 
suffices. Drawing on the example of New York banker George Opdyke, I will show 
that when depositors began losing confidence in his solvency, telegraphy could not 
match older forms of communication; Opdyke chose to write letters rather than 
telegrams. Similarly, journalists, evoking earlier ‘imagined uses’, noted that 
telegraphic cables were inherently deficient due to their lack of coherence and 
narrativity. Such practices and interpretations, I argue, depended as much on the way 
contemporaries imagined the effect of telegraphic cables on recipients as on their 
actual effect. This emphasis on imagined use and reception in turn allows me to 
highlight the way early optimistic expectations of the effect of telegraphy still 
influenced contemporary beliefs and practices decades after the technology was first 
introduced. As the Panic of 1873 shows, telegraphy was still very much considered a 
technological innovation during the 1870s. In this way, the concept of ‘imagined use’ 
helps complicate standard periodizations in the history of telegraphy. 
Throughout the following, and in line with the overall thrust of this special issue, 
my aim is to integrate the history of technology both with economic history and with 
a cultural history of discourses on technology. The history of technology, as David 
Edgerton pointed out more than fifteen years ago, can achieve this by focussing on the 
actual use of a specific technology, as well as on extant alternatives and their appeal 
as this special issue proposes. 19  In this vein, I maintain that in order to better 
understand the relationship between telegraphy and financial panics, we must look at 
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the way telegraphy was used by bankers and merchants as well as to how they 
imagined the effect of their telegrams, and finally to the use of letters. The Panic of 
1873 is an ideal case study for exploring the importance of imagined use and 
reception because it crystallized and brought to the fore, as crises are wont to do, 
beliefs and mentalities that were less visible during normal times.  
 
Wiring Intelligence During a Panic 
When in March 1837, New Orleans cotton factor Hermann, Briggs & Co. failed, it 
took a full eight days for news of the failure to reach New York by stagecoach.20 On 
the other side of the Atlantic in London, several banking houses engaged in 
transatlantic trade were also in severe distress, but due to an unpropitious 
meteorological constellation, it took several weeks for the sailing ship carrying news 
of American events to arrive in London. This delay heightened financial uncertainty 
among the City’s distressed merchants and bankers, who were also financially 
invested in North America.21 A second major transatlantic financial crisis erupted in 
1857. In the United States, westward expansion had caused land values in Kansas and 
the price of Western railroads securities to soar. In March 1857, the Supreme Court’s 
infamous Dred Scott decision cast doubt on the future of the Western territories, 
immigration to Kansas dwindled, and land values and Western railway securities 
depreciated. This put pressure on Eastern financial institutions who had financed the 
Western expansion. In October 1857, several railway companies announced their 
failure, causing a panic in New York and a run on the city’s banks. 22  By then, 
telegraphic cables criss-crossed the North American continent connecting the major 
sites of commerce. But in the absence of a transatlantic telegraph cable, news of a 
sudden decline in asset prices and bank runs in New York City was still relayed to 
Europeans by letter. This prompted panicked reactions and a wave of failures in 
Britain and in Hamburg where merchants had been heavily invested in transatlantic 
trade. The ensuing economic downturn was sharp, and lasted well into the next year, 
with growth only returning in 1859.23 The absence of (transatlantic) cables, then, did 
not stop financial unrest from spreading across vast territories and oceans. But as the 
panics of 1873 show, the advent of transatlantic telegraphy nevertheless influenced 
both the event’s trajectory as well as contemporaries’ experiences and perceptions. 
By 1873, a transatlantic multi-year construction boom in railways and a bull 
market for railway securities were drawing to a close. The proximate cause of what 
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was quickly dubbed the Panic of 1873 was the failure of Jay Cooke & Co., the 
reputable New York banking house.24 Cooke, famous financier of the Civil War, had 
failed to procure sufficient funds for the construction of his Northern Pacific Railroad, 
and had consequently seen himself forced to shift a portion of the bank’s funds to the 
road’s account to cover the shortfall. When in September 1873, like every year, 
depositors began recalling their funds in anticipation of the harvesting operations, the 
bank quickly saw its funds depleted and announced its failure on Thursday, 
September 18, 1873. The failure of such a large and reputable bank produced a 
general loss of confidence, immediately sending shockwaves through New York’s 
financial district and subsequently through the entire country and beyond. ‘To say that 
the street became excited would only give a feeble view of the expressions of feeling’, 
the New York Times reported on September 19, 1873. ‘The brokers stood perfectly 
thunderstruck for a moment, and then there was a general run to notify the different 
houses in Wall street [sic] of the failure’. Quickly, things went from bad to worse. 
‘The street (seen from Broadway) was a compact mosaic of shiny umbrellas, like a 
bed of mushrooms. Many notable speculators have suspended,’ George Templeton 
Strong noted in his diary on September 19. 25  In normal times, the speculators 
described by New York’s famous diarist could borrow from the city’s banks to 
finance their transactions on the stock exchange. But with markets in turmoil, the 
banks’ corresponding institutions in the interior began recalling their deposits. 
Consequently, loans to speculators were no longer forthcoming, resulting in many 
suspensions in quick succession.  
As more and more customers recalled their deposits, the threat of a large-scale 
bank run, and a collapse of the nation’s financial system, prompted New York’s 
financial community to swing into action. The New York Clearing House Association 
(NYCHA), comprising the city’s most important financial institutions, agreed to pool 
their members’ reserves, and to issue loan certificates, thus allowing cash-strapped 
institutions to settle inter-bank accounts. These measures, along with a temporary 
suspension of specie payments, and a temporary closure of the New York Stock 
Exchange, restored a measure of calm to the money market and stock exchange.26 
The days following Cooke’s failure were a period of frenzied cabling. At the stock 
exchange (prior to its closure), ‘the president read out the list of failures as fast as it 
was received by telegraph’, one journalist would recall in October 1873. (The 
accompanying illustration depicted a crowd of men at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, 
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anxiously inspecting the ticker tape with the latest quotations (Hearth and Home, 
October 11, 1873).) Quoting a ‘financier in London’, the New York Journal of 
Commerce noted that ‘cable traffic had much increased since the panic’ and ‘receipts 
[were] estimated at $27,000 daily’ (September 25, 1873). In early October, two 
companies, the Franklin Telegraph Company and the American District’s Telegraph 
Company would report a threefold increase in volume (New York Times, October 1, 
1873). Although this was partially reversed when the stock exchange closed its doors, 
these numbers show that a large number of market actors had used telegraphic 
messages to stay afloat of the rapidly evolving situation. 
One of these was August Belmont, the American agent of N.M. Rothschild, who 
first notified the London house of Cooke’s failure by cable, then followed up with a 
letter in which he described the day’s events in more detail.27 Such a letter, of course, 
took several days to cross the ocean, and for about two weeks, Europeans had to rely 
on brief cabled messages for intelligence about American events. Those waiting most 
eagerly for information about the New York situation were the ones with direct ties to 
New York financial institutions. This applied to a large number of exchange houses in 
the City of London whose role as an international clearing house of capital flows and 
investment inevitably exposed local merchants and bankers to disruptions on the other 
side of the Atlantic.28 Thus when money began drying up in New York, Americans 
rushed to increase their liquidity by shipping goods to England and selling the bills 
that financed these exports. Quickly, however, the market for such bills in New York 
dried up since Exchange houses and banks no longer had sufficient funds to meet the 
supply, leading to a temporary blockade in foreign exchange and disrupting grain and 
produce markets. 29 But as soon as people were informed by telegraph that Americans 
were selling their bills on London, gold began leaving the City. Commenting on these 
developments, the Economist noted that it was ‘generally believed’ in the City of 
London that the Atlantic cable had ‘been of greatest service in minimising some of the 
most dangerous effects of the American panic.’ 30  Thanks to the telegraph, New 
Yorkers quickly received ‘intelligence’ of these shipments, and, knowing its arrival 
was imminent, were able to use gold ‘by means of “cable transfers” as if it had 
arrived’. Since ‘in a panic, the prospect of relief, if certain’ was ‘almost as effectual as 
the actual relief’, the demand for gold declined. So great was this advantage, the 
correspondent concluded, that the present panic was likely to prove milder than the 
previous one solely on account of the Atlantic cable (Economist, October 4, 1873). 
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This latter prediction about the telegraph’s imagined medium-term effects was, at that 
point, wishful thinking – the correspondent imagined, but could not foresee, how 
financial and commercial affairs in London would develop during the following 
months. If this was a clear case of imagined reception, the journal’s judgment 
regarding the cable’s short-term effects, on the other hand, was closer to the mark. 
The blockade in foreign exchange, according to Sprague’s classic account of the 
Panic of 1873, lasted from September 19 to September 26, and was thus considerably 
shorter than it had been in 1857. This can be at least partially explained, as the 
Economist’s correspondent did, by the faster pace of communication in 1873.31 
London was not the only European market exposed to American events. Austria, 
much like the United States, had witnessed a period of booming railway construction 
during the previous years, fuelled by an expansion of the money supply and a surge in 
agricultural exports, and accompanied by rapidly rising asset prices and frenzied 
speculation on the Viennese stock exchange. Following a first panicked sell-off in 
May, the Viennese bourse had barely begun to recover when news of Cooke’s failure 
arrived in September. Amid an already volatile mood, the local market witnessed a 
new round of liquidations (Neue Freie Presse, September 26, 1873).32 A few days into 
the panic, the Neue Freie Presse examined the telegraph’s role in informing Austrian 
merchants. Much like the Economist, the Presse was liberal in outlook and widely 
read in business and financial circles; its business pages regularly featured original 
correspondence from London and New York. 33  The correspondent noted that the 
telegraph had made a crucial difference. Unlike in 1857, when the news of the crisis 
had arrived in Europe together with the crisis itself, now the Atlantic cable had given 
merchants time to prepare: 
The bills of exchange wandering from America to Europe and from there to 
America to be cashed in, they are still swimming, while he who here and there 
is threatened in his credit, gains time to fill the gaps which the looming crisis 
has created in his credit. Now that the merchant knows the danger that is 
approaching from the other side of the ocean, the sea separating America from 
Europe has become something like an outer wall, and the interval between the 
first news of the crisis and the first presentation of bills has become a 
scientifically created moratorium … In a time of crisis, one additional day can 
often mean a saved existence. (Neue Freie Presse, September 23, 1873) 
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Such sentiments recall an interpretation of telegraphy popular with contemporaries 
and historians alike – that it ‘annihilated’ time and space.34 The situations described in 
the Economist and the Neue Freie Presse would seem cases in point. For merchants 
and bankers waiting for the shipment of gold, the actual geographical space between 
New York and London no longer mattered; all that counted from their perspective 
was the news of shipments. Whether the gold itself took two days or two months to 
arrive was irrelevant. The interpretation offered by the Neue Freie Presse’s 
correspondent, however, suggests a somewhat more complex picture. According to 
this account, the Atlantic remained a crucial geographical barrier, and the cables 
arriving from New York and London were only valuable thanks to the relative 
sluggishness of ships. The cable did not annihilate time and space as much as create 
an additional temporal layer. It was the difference in speed between the new medium 
and old modes of transportation, and consequently between the arrival of information 
and the arrival of bills of exchange, that proved advantageous.35 
But whether the telegraph annihilated time or layered it, in both cases the upshot 
was the same – during a time of acute distress, the Atlantic cable served to improve 
communications and smooth business transactions. While we have no quantitative 
evidence that would allow us to evaluate the effect of the ‘outer wall’ described by the 
Neue Freie Presse on distressed merchants, the disruption on the transatlantic market 
for bills of exchange, as noted above, really was much shorter than it had been in 
1857.36 In this sense, then, the Atlantic cable worked much like it did in normal times: 
by wiring crucial intelligence, it reduced uncertainty, and rendered financial markets 
more predictable and efficient. 
 
Letters as a Medium of Trust 
When evaluating the role of telegraphy in this context, it is not sufficient to focus 
on what can be quantified. Rather, I argue, it is equally important to take into account 
situations in which more was at stake than simply the transmission of intelligence, of 
gold prices and specie shipments. When the public came to doubt the solvency of an 
individual, as the case of New York banker George Opdyke shows, letters, by virtue 
of their form and mode of transmission, could communicate trust in a way that cables 
could not. 
Already prior to Cooke’s failure, newspapers had reported that George Opdyke’s 
bank was in trouble and at risk of suspending payments, with some noting, however, 
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that they were most likely unfounded (New York Commercial Advertiser, afternoon 
edition, September 17, 1873). Opdyke, a former mayor of New York City, was a 
respected member of the city’s banking community but was also known to engage in 
speculative business ventures, according to a contemporary credit report.37 One of his 
main lines of business had been the New York Midland Railroad to which his bank 
was thought to have made considerable advances.38 When Cooke’s fateful dealings 
with the Northern Pacific became his undoing, therefore, New Yorkers began 
wondering whether Opdyke would be the next railway entrepreneur to fall a victim to 
the plunging market for railroad bonds. 
Initially, commenting on Cooke’s failure, Opdyke had expressed the belief that the 
‘excitement’ would ‘blow over in a few days’.39 Once papers began reporting rumours 
that he himself could be the panic’s next victim,40 the banker sprung into action, 
anxious to stave off his institution’s suspension. In this situation, time was of the 
essence: Since it was standard practice for bankers to lend in excess of their bank’s 
reserves, almost no financial institution, no matter how strong, was able to withstand a 
sustained run of depositors on its assets. Such a scramble for cash by depositors, of 
course, was the very essence of a banking panic, and Opdyke would only be able to 
escape the merciless logic of a self-fulfilling prophecy by assuring the financial 
community of his solvency. In a statement to the New York Times, Opdyke 
consequently insisted that his house was sound, affirming ‘in the most positive terms 
that the house or its creditors had nothing to fear. All they required was a little time to 
tide over the present difficulty.’ (September 19, 1873)  
Opdyke’s statement that he merely needed a little time, however, was only credible 
as long as his protestations could be matched by continued public demonstrations and 
private reassurances of solvency. Accordingly, he spent the next several days writing 
letters to correspondents from all over the country informing them that his bank was 
meeting all demands and would continue to do so. On September 19, he wrote: ‘The 
malicious rumor[s] of our suspension are utterly false. They were circulated by stock 
speculators for their own ends. You need have no fear of the perfect responsibility of 
our house.’ On the same day, he told another correspondent: ‘We have had no trouble 
today nor had we yesterday in meeting everything promptly. I have no fear of our 
ability to continue to do so. You must have no fear as to the responsibility of our 
house. Affairs are looking better this afternoon + probably have seen the worst.’ By 
the end of the month, Opdyke finally felt vindicated: ‘The papers seemed determined 
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to make us “stop payment”’, he wrote, ‘but we did not falter for a moment nor doubt 
our perfect ability to weather the storm.’41  
Opdyke’s choice of medium during this momentous period is significant. Why, we 
may ask, did he chose to pen letters to his business partners in other cities (which 
would take at least one day, and often longer, to arrive) rather than send telegrams? If 
a bank was in danger of suspending payments, it was imperative that all rumours to 
this effect be squashed as quickly as possible lest they become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy and trigger a bank run. If a bank was not in imminent danger, on the other 
hand, and had sufficient funds to withstand a run for several days, even a malicious 
rumour would not be able to bring it down because the very demonstration of 
solvency would be enough to disprove it. In Opdyke’s case, we may reasonably 
assume that he was certain that his bank had sufficient funds and would continue to 
make payments for a considerable amount of time. For this reason, it was not 
necessary to send out reassurances as quickly as possible. By informing 
correspondents of his bank’s solvency by letter, Opdyke could demonstrate, simply 
through the choice of his medium, that there was no cause for concern. Had he chosen 
to send a telegram, on the other hand, he would inevitably have signalled haste and 
urgency, and this in itself could have been interpreted as a sign that his bank was 
indeed about to collapse. The message he conveyed in letters was both a function of 
their form and content and of their transmission: they conveyed calmness and 
confidence because they were slower to arrive than telegrams and because their 
content appeared more measured and more elaborate than that of a telegram.42 
The case of George Opdyke and the financial panic, then, is indicative of the 
perceived limitations of the way the telegraphic medium was commonly used by 
business men. Opdyke, we may assume, considered telegrams deficient because he 
imagined a context of reception in which more was at play than just the message’s 
content. If, as suggested above, telegraphy was well suited to transmitting 
‘intelligence’ in the narrow sense, it revealed its limitations when crisis struck, and 
merely relaying information was no longer sufficient to change the trajectory of 
events. What was needed, instead, was something altogether more complex: Opdyke 
needed his correspondents to trust him – trust, being, of course, a crucial ingredient 
for any actor in the nineteenth-century marketplace, and especially so for a banker.43 
Trust, as Georg Simmel noted, is a means of reducing uncertainty through a peculiar 
mixture of knowing and not-knowing. A person chooses to trust another person, even 
 13
though they can never be entirely certain their confidence is warranted. As such, the 
decision always involves a leap into the unknown, and Opdyke’s choice of medium 
encouraged his correspondents to take this leap. 44  The element of uncertainty, of 
course, is all the more pronounced during a crisis, a situation which, by definition, is 
one in need of resolution and thus a moment of decision.45 
 
Journalists, Crisis, and Narrativity 
As Opdyke’s case illustrates, then, communication during a financial crisis was not 
just about the transmission of intelligence. Somewhat unexpectedly perhaps, this was 
true not just of bankers in existential distress but of European journalists, too, who, 
during the first two weeks of the panic, had little to go on besides telegraphic reports. 
These were reprinted and summarized in great number during this time. Often, 
however, this was accompanied by commentary that was rather sceptical of 
telegraphy’s role in the crisis.  
On September 19, 1873, the Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, Germany’s foremost 
financial publication, had published a telegram from Reuters’ London office in its 
evening edition, noting that Cooke’s bank had suspended payments. At this point, the 
correspondent explained, the only thing that could be said for certain was that its 
troubles stemmed from the bank’s involvement with the Northern Pacific Railroad. 
During the following days, news from New York proliferated as more telegrams 
began pouring in and observers in Vienna and Berlin tried to assess the effects the 
American events would have on European markets.  
For German observers, this period was one of uncertainty. In the wake of the 
proclamation of the German Empire in 1871 and a string of liberal economic reforms 
in the late 1860s and early 1870s, newly unified Germany, too, had seen a boom in 
railway construction and a proliferation of newly established joint-stock companies, 
partly fuelled by the payment of the French war indemnity.46 Then, following a period 
of rapidly rising prices, the Berlin bourse had entered a phase of protracted decline in 
November 1872,47 though things had begun looking brighter in August 1873, leading 
some observers to hope that a full-blown German crisis might yet be averted. When 
Cooke’s bank’s failure was announced in German papers, therefore, German financial 
circles were anxious to learn more. Many Germans had invested considerable sums in 
American railroads, lured by dazzling prospectuses promising high rates of return 
compared to those of German companies. By the summer of 1873, some of these were 
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already in default – though none as large in scale as the Northern Pacific.48 If the 
American banking crisis were to develop into a serious commercial crisis, moreover, 
German businesses were almost sure to be affected. What Germans feared most, then, 
was the kind of transatlantic financial contagion the world had last seen sixteen years 
earlier when a banking panic in New York had triggered the bankruptcy of almost 
three hundred merchants in Hamburg alone.49 
In this situation, many journalists felt the information provided by news agencies 
via cable (only very few papers had the means to pay an American correspondent) 
was inadequate. The more telegrams arrived, indeed, the more confusing the situation 
became. Following an agreement in the 1870s between Reuters, Havas, the French 
news agency, and WTB, its German counterpart, telegraphic news from the United 
States was compiled by a Reuters agent in New York and forwarded to London. 
There, it was then translated into German or French and sent to newspapers on the 
Continent who paid for this service as subscribers.50 The time between telegram being 
sent from New York and printed in newspapers was short: generally, telegraphic 
reports from New York were not older than one day. 
‘At the moment the contradictions are so great’, the Börsen-Zeitung reported on 20 
September 1873, ‘that it is not possible to gauge the extent to which European 
markets are affected.’ Two days later, things had still not improved. ‘It is on the 
whole a remarkable phenomenon’, the same paper now noted, ‘that the news 
regarding the large American failures are thus far rather sketchy, and that the 
telegraph, which normally reports on all American events in such great detail, in this 
case is in no way fulfilling its obligations.’ In this imaginary, it seemed almost as 
though the technology had assumed an agency of its own, thus eliding that of its 
users. On the 25th, the economist Max Wirth attempted to shed light on the evolving 
situation in an article for the liberal Schlesische Presse but had to admit that the 
‘telegraphic reports’ on which his analysis was based seemed ‘aphoristic, often 
cryptic and contradictory.’51 Similarly, a journalist in Frankfurt complained that an 
employee of the Wagner agency tasked with transmitting Reuters telegrams to 
Frankfurt had mistakenly noted the closure of the ‘Clearing House’ instead of the 
‘Gold Clearing House’ and, even more confusingly, said that Chicago had temporarily 
banned all ‘wheat sales’ (Getreideverkäufe) when in fact the message should have 
read ‘futures trading’ (Zeitverkäufe) (Frankfurter Zeitung, October 3, 1873).52 This 
critique of telegraphy was not confined to German journalists. In London, the 
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Economist likewise bemoaned the scantiness of the telegraphic cables received from 
New York. Commenting on the NYCHA’s issuance of loan certificates, the journal’s 
correspondent admitted that this measure was ‘quite unintelligible to us from the bare 
allusion in the telegrams.’ (Economist, September 27, 1873)  
While German journalists reassured themselves that all was not lost, and that the 
German commercial world would resist the onslaught of ominous news from across 
the Atlantic (Der Aktionär, September 28, 1873), the palpable sense of fear and 
urgency in these indictments of the telegraphic medium suggests that such 
reassurances were largely of a strategic nature. If commentators had been certain of 
the robustness of their domestic market, their craving for Americans news would have 
been less pronounced. The days and weeks that followed would show that such fears 
were not unwarranted, and that the German financial and commercial world was 
indeed highly susceptible to shocks from outside. In October 1873, the Quistorp’sche 
Vereinsbank, a well-known Berlin institution, suspended payments; soon, 
bankruptcies were being announced in German newspapers far and wide and the 
outlook in commercial circles had become decidedly pessimistic.53  
While Germans were still busy trying to piece together the sequence of events and 
understanding their significance, Americans in early October 1873 were already 
beginning to take stock of the lessons learned, with many excoriating the 
foolhardiness and recklessness of bankers and speculators in strongly moralistic 
terms. Harper’s Weekly, reporting from New York, looked back on the past month’s 
events and observed that ‘men who are generally cool and clear-headed’ had ‘become 
so wrought up by mutual influence, by reports, suspicions and fears, that wild 
excitement’ had ‘utterly’ overthrown reason. ‘The statement has been made,’ the 
correspondent continued, 
that by means of the telegraph the situation of Wall Street at its most 
critical moment was better understood in Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and 
St. Louis than by the frenzied crowds of brokers, bankers, and speculators in 
New York, who huddled together only to stimulate the wild and ruinous 
excitement which individual coolness, confidence, and courage would have 
decidedly checked. (Harper’s Weekly, October 11, 1873)  
This, then, suggested a different picture: the telegraph was not an agent of 
disinformation but of order and calmness. In a situation marked by chaos and ‘wild 
and ruinous excitement’, the telegraph and the ‘telegraph style’, this writer implied, 
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isolated and filtered intelligence, thus stripping the event of its opaqueness and 
rendering it intelligible. Those who through their desperate actions created and 
sustained the panic, by contrast, were at the mercy of ‘mutual influences, ... reports, 
suspicions and fears’ (ibid.) – volatile emotions that had nothing in common with the 
intelligence investors in normal times relied on.  
How may we interpret these claims? Did the telegraph fail to transmit vital 
intelligence just when it mattered most? Or was it, on the contrary, a medium that 
brought order to chaos, as the Harper’s writer claimed? There is little evidence to 
suggest that people in other American cities had a better grasp of the New York panic 
than New Yorkers themselves. Brokers huddling in the streets of Manhattan’s 
financial district were indeed unlikely to have a clear idea of what the markets’ next 
movements would be (did they ever?), and how to best salvage their investments. At 
the same time, however, the New York financial community had, after all, managed 
to successfully calm markets and avert a full-blown collapse of the system, suggesting 
they were well equipped to make sense of the unfolding crisis. It seems unlikely, then, 
that telegraphy made much difference in this respect. A banker’s understanding of the 
situation depended less on any specific medium but rather on past experience (thus 
the loan certificates used by the Clearing House had been devised in the aftermath of 
the Panic of 1857)54 and an abstract, general notion of the functioning of the money 
market which did not rely on any particular piece or form of intelligence. But the fact 
that the Harper’s writer imagined the telegraph as an agent of calmness is indicative 
of the myriad possibilities that were still ascribed to this technology decades after its 
first introduction. 
As for the German complaints regarding the sketchiness of telegraphic reports, 
there is likewise not much evidence to support the contemporary view according to 
which the German public was at first significantly less well informed of Wall Street 
events than New Yorkers. While Germans had less information to work with initially, 
more information did not automatically translate into a better grasp of the situation. In 
New York, too, uncertainty reigned and rumours abounded during the first few days – 
if not among the members of the NYCHA, then certainly among many observers and 
investors. On September 24, for example, the New York Journal of Commerce 
summarized the day’s event with an optimistic headline: ‘The Panic Subsiding.’ On 
the 25th, however, the New York merchant Simon F. Mackie seemed unsure whether 
the panic was truly over: ‘The panic of last week has somewhat subsided but everyone 
 17
is looked upon with suspicion and it is utterly impossible to say whether it is over or 
no.’55 Thus, when a Reuters correspondent reported that the mood in New York had 
improved and the next cable reporting further failures implicitly undermined this 
assessment, he was not necessarily embellishing the facts; more likely, he was 
accurately depicting the volatile and constantly changing atmosphere in New York. 
But while on Wall Street, this was interpreted as a natural feature of a panic, 
Europeans tended to view this as a sign of inefficient communication and a 
consequence of the telegraphic medium itself. 
The main reason for skepticism vis-à-vis telegraphy, I would argue, was that the 
panic called into question the very nature of conventional ‘intelligence’ – brief notices 
of a quantitative or descriptive nature that might inform an investor’s decision. During 
a financial panic, the usefulness of such ‘intelligence’ from a journalistic perspective 
was fairly limited. For events evolved with such rapidity that any individual piece of 
intelligence was likely to be obsolete by the time it reached its destination. With the 
panic at its height, even a few hours could make a crucial difference. Consequently, 
when pondering the quality of the news transmitted during the panic, journalists and 
other observers emphasized completeness and coherence, often implying that only a 
narrative account of causal sequences could be considered an adequate rendition of 
the chaotic event known as a ‘panic’. Describing the panic in real time, before it had 
run its course, presented journalists with a considerable challenge, as the Chronicle 
noted on September 27, 1873: ‘Amidst the great confusion and excitement which has 
been prevalent in financial circles since the date of our last report, and the occurrence 
of important events crowding one upon another in rapid succession, it is somewhat 
difficult to give a review of the past week which shall be at all satisfactory.’ In a 
similar vein, a British journalist noted on the same day that there was ‘so much still 
obscure in the telegrams that for a detailed description of the remedial measures 
adopted and their operation we must wait for newspapers and correspondence 
covering the period described.’ (Economist, September 27, 1873) From a journalistic 
perspective, then, an account of a financial panic required more than just morsels of 
intelligence. A panic, this interpretation implied, could only be made sense of in a 
narrative, linear form, with the benefit of hindsight. Isolated bits of information 
lacked context and coherence; they elided the question of causality and frustrated 
observers’ desire for completeness. In this respect, the panics of 1873 were not 
unusual: as Amelia Bonea and Dwayne Winseck respectively have shown, both the 
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Franco-Prussian war and the Latin American debt crisis in 1874 prompted similar 
critiques in journalistic circles.56 In times of crisis, both political and financial, it 
seems, contemporaries displayed an increased awareness of the mediated and media-
based nature of events which then became the topic of critical reflection and 
discussion. 
 
Conclusion 
What, then, are we to make of contemporary opinions regarding the use and imagined 
reception of telegraphic cables, both real and imagined, in a time of financial panic? 
The panic clearly gave rise to different assessments, with some highlighting the 
telegraph’s efficacy while others lamented its deficiencies. To some extent, the cases 
presented in this article dovetail with much of the economic history literature on the 
subject: telegraphy indeed worked to the advantage of market actors, providing them 
with timely, crucial intelligence that worked to calm the exchange market much faster 
than had been possible in earlier crises. Unlike journalists, who wrote for private 
investors and a wider public, professional and experienced market actors did not 
require a coherent, encompassing account of the panic. Instead, they continued to 
make decisions much as they did during calmer times, on a case-by-case basis, relying 
on isolated bits of information that nevertheless provided a sufficient basis for 
financial decision-making. In this respect, telegraphy and the press played a crucial 
role not just in mediating, but in defining and shaping the panic. The many thousand 
individual decisions and actions that together defined and constituted the financial 
crises of 1873 were informed by, and in turn mediated through, telegraphic press 
reports, a self-reinforcing dynamic without which the panics cannot be adequately 
understood. 
At the same time, however, both observers and market actors by and large refrained 
from making what at first glance might seem like a rather obvious charge: namely that 
the almost instantaneous transmission of the news of Cooke’s failure precipitated the 
transatlantic contagion of financial distress, and prompted an overreaction in 
European business circles. The Economist’s correspondent, in his detailed account of 
the telegraph’s effect on transatlantic specie flows, was one of the few observers to 
suggest as much in his otherwise positive assessment: ‘it is only fair to admit’, he 
noted, ‘that [the telegraph] has a drawback at times in its echoing power—each 
money market is troubled by bad news of the other, and the bad news tends to 
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accumulate.’ But on balance, he concluded, the telegraph’s ‘calming effect’ was 
stronger than its ‘echoing power’ (October 4, 1873). At the same time, there were 
many voices that were considerably more skeptical regarding the telegraph’s 
potential. George Opdyke’s case, I have argued, suggests that telegraphy appeared 
deficient in a crucial respect: In a time of crisis, it could transmit intelligence but not 
trust. But when such intangible issues as trust and confidence were at stake, the 
medium could matter as much, or more than the message. Opdyke’s case illustrates 
how some market actors could actively employ different types of media to their ends, 
and that the choice of medium was in important ways informed by the way the sender 
imagined its reception.  
Journalistic reports written both during and after the panic at first seem to suggest a 
contradictory picture. These apparent contradictions, I would argue, can be explained 
by the respective positions of both observers on the one hand and market actors on the 
other, or of passive and active users of cables, of senders and recipients. While, in 
another case of imagined reception, an observer in New York, evoking an unspecified 
source (‘it has been said’), speculated that telegraphic information received in other 
cities provided outsiders with a better grasp of the situation than New Yorkers, 
journalists in Germany came to the opposite conclusion. German journalists who felt 
let down by the sometimes unintelligible information contained in telegrams, I have 
argued, were primarily concerned with providing their readers with as accurate an 
account as possible, an account which had to conform to standard journalistic 
requirements of completeness, coherence, and narrativity. Where the summary 
statements of cables did not add up to a coherent picture, they blamed the medium for 
what was in fact a constitutive feature of any financial crisis. These different 
perspectives help explain why telegraphy was subject to such disparate assessments.  
It seems plausible, moreover, to interpret these disparate, often critical voices as a 
testament to the longevity of older imaginaries that continued to inform expectations 
decades after they were first formed. In telegraphy’s early days, as seen above, many 
observers imagined that its practical use would lead to an improvement in the 
transmission of information; more and speedier information, in this imaginary, was 
tantamount to an overall increase in knowledge. In this way, imagined use continued 
to inform interpretations of actual use for several decades, a dynamic that was 
discernible in other cases, too.57 It would thus seem promising to investigate if and 
when in the late 19th or early 20th century this early imagined use shed its hold on 
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contemporaries, and telegraphy was no longer considered in the light of old imagined 
promises but as a technology whose advantages and disadvantages in times of crisis 
were accepted as a matter of course.  
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